Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Principles of Philosophy of the Future' and 'Philosophies of Mathematics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


66 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach]
Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman]
The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman]
Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs in which a∈A and b∈B [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman]
'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman]
A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman]
The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman]
The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman]
Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman]
Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman]
Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman]
Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach]
Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach]
The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach]
God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach]
God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach]