183 ideas
20383 | The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche] |
4520 | I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche] |
2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
4545 | Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche] |
4530 | Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche] |
4523 | What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche] |
4531 | Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche] |
4541 | Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche] |
2939 | If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein] |
20357 | Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche] |
4534 | 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche] |
4548 | Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche] |
5652 | True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton] |
4508 | The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche] |
10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
10967 | Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein] |
7087 | Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
4702 | The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady] |
7056 | Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein] |
23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
4538 | Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche] |
23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
18277 | If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein] |
18162 | The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
7537 | Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
23496 | Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein] |
18154 | The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock] |
13429 | The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey] |
18268 | Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein] |
10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
7784 | 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein] |
23506 | Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein] |
7089 | A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein] |
9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette] |
15089 | Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
13830 | Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking] |
19292 | Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein] |
20361 | We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche] |
18160 | The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein] |
18153 | A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein] |
18161 | The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
6849 | Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
23509 | The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
4533 | Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche] |
13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
20359 | The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche] |
7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
4525 | There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche] |
4543 | There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche] |
4484 | Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche] |
7969 | The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein] |
7968 | A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein] |
4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
4544 | A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche] |
23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
9442 | The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein] |
4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
23487 | What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein] |
23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
12869 | Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein] |
4537 | We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche] |
4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
4487 | A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche] |
23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
4529 | All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche] |
4532 | We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche] |
6591 | Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein] |
4486 | The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche] |
17665 | The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong] |
2941 | Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein] |
17673 | The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein] |
4536 | It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche] |
2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
4551 | Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche] |
4527 | Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche] |
23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
23938 | Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche] |
23939 | We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche] |
23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
4554 | The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche] |
4552 | There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche] |
2943 | Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein] |
4521 | None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche] |
4496 | 'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche] |
20136 | There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche] |
20358 | The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche] |
20369 | The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche] |
4506 | There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche] |
4514 | The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche] |
2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |
20370 | All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche] |
20354 | The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche] |
4505 | How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche] |
4509 | Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche] |
4500 | It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche] |
4558 | We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche] |
4550 | Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche] |
4517 | Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche] |
4518 | The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
4519 | The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche] |
4560 | The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche] |
4555 | The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche] |
4494 | Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche] |
4498 | 'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche] |
4493 | Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche] |
4511 | We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche] |
4512 | Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche] |
20372 | The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
4510 | A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche] |
4515 | Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche] |
4516 | Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche] |
4559 | When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche] |
4557 | The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche] |
4507 | The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche] |
4501 | Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche] |
4489 | If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche] |
4513 | Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche] |
4504 | Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche] |
4495 | The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche] |
4491 | In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche] |
4542 | Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche] |
4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
4535 | A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche] |
4497 | The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche] |
4488 | Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche] |
4502 | Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche] |
4499 | Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche] |