24 ideas
| 18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
| 18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
| 18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
| 18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
| 18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
| 18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
| 18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
| 18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
| 18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
| 18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |