Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'A Free Will' and 'Value Theory'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / e. Late classical philosophy
In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M]
In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M]
The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M]
For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M]