Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Interview with Philippa Foot' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]