Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introduction to 'Absolute Generality'' and 'The Reasons of Love'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13451 The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13452 Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
13449 We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
13450 Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13453 Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
9240 Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
13448 The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228 Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
9238 Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9232 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
9234 If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9233 Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
9229 What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
9235 Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
9237 The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
9239 I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
9236 Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
9227 We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
9230 People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9241 Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9300 Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
9231 Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]