54 ideas
| 23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
| 23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
| 23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
| 23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
| 23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
| 23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
| 23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
| 23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
| 23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
| 23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
| 23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
| 23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
| 23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
| 23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
| 23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
| 23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
| 23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
| 23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
| 23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
| 23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
| 23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| 23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
| 23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |