Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Mirror Mirror - Is That All?' and 'Propositions'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick]