Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Naming and Necessity lectures' and 'Human, All Too Human'

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146 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche]
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche]
Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche]
Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche]
Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche]
The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche]
Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche]
Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche]