161 ideas
| 7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
| 1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
| 2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
| 2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
| 4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
| 13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
| 13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
| 13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
| 13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
| 13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
| 13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
| 13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
| 13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
| 13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
| 13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
| 13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
| 13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
| 13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
| 13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
| 13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
| 10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
| 13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
| 13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
| 13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
| 13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
| 13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
| 13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
| 13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
| 13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
| 13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
| 13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
| 13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
| 13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
| 13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
| 13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
| 2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
| 2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
| 13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
| 13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
| 13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
| 13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
| 13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
| 13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
| 2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
| 3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
| 17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
| 13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
| 13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
| 13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
| 13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
| 13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
| 2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
| 3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
| 13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
| 20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
| 1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
| 6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
| 6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
| 2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
| 3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
| 1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
| 4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
| 13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
| 6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
| 2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
| 2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
| 2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
| 6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
| 2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
| 3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
| 2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
| 2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
| 2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
| 2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
| 2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
| 6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
| 2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
| 3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
| 2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
| 2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
| 2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
| 2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
| 4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
| 3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
| 21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
| 1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
| 1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
| 1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
| 2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
| 6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
| 2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
| 2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
| 2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
| 3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
| 2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
| 6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
| 3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
| 4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
| 4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
| 7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
| 5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
| 3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
| 2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
| 2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| 2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
| 2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
| 2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
| 2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
| 2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
| 2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
| 2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
| 2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
| 2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
| 3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
| 2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
| 3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |