Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic' and 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10001 An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10007 Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
10002 '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber]
9998 What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10003 Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
10008 Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10005 Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
10000 We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10006 First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
10004 Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]