Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory' and 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda'

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31 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]