Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula' and 'On the Heavens'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
19740 A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
398 Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
394 An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
396 There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
16102 Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
17463 An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
399 If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
20918 Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
403 The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
402 The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
1498 Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
395 It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]