17 ideas
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |