18 ideas
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |