Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'To be is to be the value of a variable..' and 'What Mary Didn't Know'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People

15833

Tell cleverness from answers, but wisdom from questions [Mahfouz]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing

7785	The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory

10699

Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic

10225

Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]

10736

Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]

10780

Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic

10697

Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification

13671

Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

10267

We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]

10698

Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification

7806	Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers

10700

First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

4894	I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]

4895	Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]

4886	Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]