Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
15833 Tell cleverness from answers, but wisdom from questions [Mahfouz]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
6848 Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
6847 Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6844 Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
6835 German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
6837 Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
6836 Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
6838 Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
6845 Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
6846 Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
21322 We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
1356 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
6843 Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]