Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'How the Laws of Physics Lie', 'The Analysis of Mind' and 'Anselm and Actuality'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
16456 For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16185 Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6417 In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
6474 Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6476 We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2792 It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
22326 Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
16182 Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
16184 An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16167 Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N]
16169 Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N]
16176 Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N]
16177 I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N]
16180 You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N]
16171 The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
16183 In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
6475 In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
16175 A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6781 There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird]
16166 Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
16179 Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16170 To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N]
16181 Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N]
16178 There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N]