37 ideas
23657 | The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid] |
23655 | An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
23659 | If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid] |
23662 | The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid] |
23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
23654 | In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid] |
23660 | The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid] |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
23658 | Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid] |
23656 | The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid] |
23653 | If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
23663 | There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid] |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |