Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'How the Laws of Physics Lie', 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians' and 'What Metaphors Mean'

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25 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16185 Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
16182 Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
16184 An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16167 Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N]
16169 Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N]
16176 Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N]
16177 I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N]
16180 You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N]
16171 The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
13195 To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
16183 In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
13193 Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
7776 Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
7777 We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
7775 Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
16175 A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
13194 God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6781 There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird]
16166 Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
16179 Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16170 To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N]
16181 Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N]
16178 There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
13196 All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
13192 Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]