46 ideas
| 9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
| 10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| 13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
| 8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| 18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
| 8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
| 18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
| 10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| 18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
| 9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
| 18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
| 18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
| 18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
| 18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
| 13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
| 18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
| 16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
| 8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| 18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
| 13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
| 13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
| 13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
| 13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
| 18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
| 16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
| 16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
| 16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
| 16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
| 16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
| 16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
| 16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
| 16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
| 13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
| 13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
| 16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
| 9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
| 16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
| 6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
| 16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
| 16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
| 16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
| 16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
| 16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
| 18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
| 18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
| 18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |