35 ideas
13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |