35 ideas
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
19690 | 'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm] |
19691 | Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm] |
19692 | You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm] |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |