42 ideas
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |