Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Essence (1st edn)', 'On Relations of Universals and Particulars' and 'A Powers Theory of Modality'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]