75 ideas
| 21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
| 21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
| 21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
| 14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
| 14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
| 14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
| 14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
| 14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
| 14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
| 14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
| 14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
| 14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
| 14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
| 21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
| 14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| 14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
| 21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
| 21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
| 21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
| 21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
| 21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
| 21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
| 21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
| 21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
| 21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
| 21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
| 21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
| 21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
| 21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
| 21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
| 21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
| 21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
| 21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
| 21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
| 21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
| 21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
| 21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
| 21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
| 21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
| 21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |