Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of What Might Have Been', 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' and 'What is an Emotion?'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11832 We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11863 (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
14746 What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11900 We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
11870 Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11866 The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14744 Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
11852 Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
11875 Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
14749 Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
11844 If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11861 We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11871 Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
11879 Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
11835 The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
11876 It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
11858 The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
11831 The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
11839 Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
11845 Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
11869 Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11850 Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11848 Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23981 Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
11859 The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
11860 Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]