Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of What Might Have Been', 'The Particle Zoo' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'

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52 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh]
Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh]
Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh]
Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh]
Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh]
In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh]
Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh]