81 ideas
| 20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
| 14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
| 14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
| 14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
| 14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
| 14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
| 14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 17926 | Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan] |
| 17925 | Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan] |
| 17924 | Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan] |
| 17929 | Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan] |
| 17930 | Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan] |
| 17928 | Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan] |
| 17923 | Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan] |
| 17941 | Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan] |
| 17922 | Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan] |
| 17936 | Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan] |
| 17940 | Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan] |
| 17931 | Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan] |
| 17932 | If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan] |
| 20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
| 14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
| 24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
| 14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
| 14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
| 14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
| 14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
| 14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| 14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
| 20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
| 20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
| 4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
| 6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
| 24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
| 17943 | Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan] |
| 17939 | Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan] |
| 17938 | Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan] |
| 17934 | Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan] |
| 17933 | Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan] |
| 17935 | If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan] |
| 17942 | Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan] |
| 20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
| 20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
| 17937 | Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan] |
| 2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
| 24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
| 24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
| 2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
| 20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
| 24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
| 20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
| 4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
| 2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
| 24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
| 20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
| 24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
| 2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
| 6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |