13 ideas
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |