Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Troubles with Functionalism', 'Mathematical logic and theory of types' and 'Vagaries of Definition'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
11064 Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
6407 The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
8203 All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10418 Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell]
10047 Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave]
23478 Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
21718 Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
18126 A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock]
18128 Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock]
18124 Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
2584 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
2582 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2574 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2578 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
2585 Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
2586 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2579 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
2577 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
2580 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
8202 Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
2581 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
8201 The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]