32 ideas
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |