35 ideas
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |