9 ideas
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |