Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Troubles with Functionalism', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'The Second Coming'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophers should interpret the world, by expressing its possibilities [Berardi]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Nothingness only exists in consciousness [Berardi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The delusion of free will brings a sense of guilt [Berardi]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
American white men trusted the philosophy of winning, and then discovered losing [Berardi]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Community is now a nostalgic memory, which no longer exists [Berardi]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Communism failed to unite western workers with the oppressed of the south [Berardi]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The economy has replaced medieval theocracy at the centre of our society [Berardi]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Western workers turn to nationalism, to avert the effects of globalisation [Berardi]