Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Troubles with Functionalism', 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience' and 'Explanation - Opening Address'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
17070 Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart]
17072 We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
17073 I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
17077 The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart]
17078 Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
17061 Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart]
17074 Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart]
17076 Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
17071 An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17062 If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
17075 Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
2584 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
8130 Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
2582 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2574 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2578 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
2585 Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
2586 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2579 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
2577 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
2580 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
2581 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
17063 Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart]