19 ideas
| 19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
| 19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
| 19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
| 19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
| 19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
| 23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
| 23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
| 23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
| 23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
| 23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
| 23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
| 23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
| 23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
| 19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
| 19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
| 19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
| 19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
| 19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
| 18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |