26 ideas
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |