33 ideas
20771 | Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius] |
6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
6028 | Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius] |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
20831 | The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes] |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |
5993 | The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman] |