21 ideas
14970 | Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell] |
14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
14972 | S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell] |
14973 | In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell] |
14976 | Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell] |
14974 | A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell] |
14975 | A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell] |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
23224 | That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley] |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |