20 ideas
| 7082 | Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley] |
| 15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
| 2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
| 2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
| 2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
| 2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
| 2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
| 2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
| 2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
| 2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
| 2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
| 2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
| 3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
| 2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
| 2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
| 2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
| 22155 | We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter] |