Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Inverted Earth', 'Natural Goodness' and 'Mereology'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10653 Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10648 Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
10655 Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
10659 There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10661 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10647 Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
10651 If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
10649 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
10654 The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
10652 Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
6172 The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]