Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Troubles with Functionalism', 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents' and 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction'

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28 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey]
Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey]
Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey]
The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey]
An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey]
Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]