Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Defense of Presentism', 'Events' and 'Letter to Bramhall'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14001 People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
13991 Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
15565 Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
15566 Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
15567 Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
15561 The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
15564 An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
15563 Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16620 A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
16622 Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14002 Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
14000 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
15562 Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
13990 Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
13992 Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
13994 Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
13995 Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
13996 Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
13997 Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
13993 Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
13998 Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
13999 People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]