Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Defense of Presentism', 'The Question of Ontology' and 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism''

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]