19 ideas
14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |