32 ideas
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
| 4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
| 4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
| 4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |