Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'The Problem of Knowledge' and 'Utilitarianism'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill]
Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill]
Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill]
Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill]
Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill]
Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]