Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)', 'World and Essence' and 'works'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
18241 Sufficient reason is implied by contradiction, of an insufficient possible which exists [Wolff, by Korsgaard]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
12394 If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14292 Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
4794 We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
18242 Confucius shows that ethics can rest on reason, rather than on revelation [Wolff, by Korsgaard]