20 ideas
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
| 22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
| 22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
| 22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |